The ‘kind of problem cities pose’: Jane Jacobs at the intersection of philosophy, pedagogy, and urban theory

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The matter of cities is, as urban critic Jane Jacobs argued, a complex problem akin to the life sciences. As a rich tradition of philosophical and geographical thought has suggested (Bergson, Lefebvre, and Harvey), the city is not a thing but a process. In order to reconcile process methodology and pedagogy, this essay explores six key ideas distilled from Jacobs’ classic work *The death and life of great American cities*. These six pedagogical tenets suggest a radical departure from the framework of ‘banking education’, denounced by both Paolo Freire and bell hooks, and emphasize the need to engage students in an interdisciplinary and self-directed investigation of the city rooted in their own experiences. Incorporating the ideas of thinkers from many disciplinary traditions, this essay emphasizes that knowledge is a process involving the ongoing formulation of complex questions rather than the search for simple answers.

**Keywords:** Jane Jacobs; cities; process; critical pedagogy; Henri Lefebvre; Henri Bergson

Introduction

Frequently the only possible answer is a critique of the question, and the only possible solution is to negate the question. Karl Marx (1973, 127)

The truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the problem and consequently of positing it, even more than of solving it. Henri Bergson (1934, 51, original emphasis).

Merely to think about cities and get somewhere, one of the main things to know is what kind of problem cities pose, for all problems cannot be thought about in the same way. Jane Jacobs (1961, 428, original emphasis)

This essay is about the city and the way it is experienced, conceived, and taught. It is clear that in recent years the problem of cities has increasingly come to constitute one of the primary topics of investigation in disciplines as diverse as sociology, geography, political science, anthropology, and even literature and philosophy. Clashing with entrenched models of pedagogy that see teaching and learning in terms of the simple transmission and reception of static knowledge, many of the theories that undergird such urban investigations have asserted that the city is not a thing, but a temporal process. In this context, it becomes necessary to explicitly reconcile a changing methodological approach to cities with pedagogical practices.

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that similarly approach knowledge itself as an open and evolving system, one that is, moreover, deeply rooted in individual experiences. Methodologically, the city can no longer be approached in static terms as something that can be reduced to a finite number of statistics, facts, or events. Pedagogically, the city cannot be approached as traditional content, something ‘out there’ that holds one meaning. Instead, the city is complex, constantly evolving, and changing, just as our understanding of it evolves and changes. This essay thus seeks to reconcile the disciplinary emphases on process from philosophy (Henri Bergson and Henri Lefebvre), urban studies (Lefebvre and David Harvey), and critical pedagogy (Paolo Freire and bell hooks), by returning to anti-urbanist Jane Jacobs’s book *The death and life of great American cities* (1961).

In her classic work, Jacobs gives direction on how to pursue this necessary reconciliation between process methodology and critical pedagogy. She implicitly reinforces the philosophical stress on process that runs from Henri Bergson to Henri Lefebvre and beyond (notably urban geographer David Harvey and anthropologist Manuel Delgado, see Fraser 2007a), providing the opportunity to dwell on the particular consequences that this philosophical emphasis has for the study of urban phenomena. *Death and life* emphasizes that cities are part of a complex process and suggests – albeit indirectly – six key tenets of which pedagogy might make use when approaching the problems of city life. Launching off from these six key tenets, this essay will make the philosophical case for considering cities as complex processes from both a methodological and pedagogical standpoint. The first part of the essay will treat the question of method using Jacobs’ work to emphasize that one should: (1) avoid simplistic definitions, (2) critique abstractions and applaud the concrete, and (3) renounce the discourse of art and return to the real world. The second part will focus on pedagogy, similarly underscoring that one should: (4) start from experience, (5) embrace interdisciplinarity, and (6) get feedback. These tenets are of great methodological and pedagogical value not only important because they come from one of the most outspoken anti-urbanist critics of the twentieth century but also because they resonate with ideas from philosophy, geography, and pedagogy. Jacobs’ classic text suggests ways to construct pedagogy of process to complement recent process-oriented methodological approaches to the city in numerous disciplines.

**Matters of methodology**

In the early 1960s, Jane Jacobs published *The death and life of great American cities* (1961) alongside Rachel Carson’s *Silent spring* (1962) and Betty Friedan’s *The feminine mystique* (1963). Although she certainly had her critics (notably Robert Moses) and was often shunned merely for being a woman intruding upon the traditionally male world of urban planning, her book remains a classic of the field today. She denounced the irresponsible nature of speculative urban planning, highlighted the importance of the life of the city sidewalk, touted the benefits of mixed use before it was popular and fought many an urban renewal scheme both in New York and later in Toronto. Refusing to mince words, she was perhaps scorned as much for her defiant tone as for her ideas – the first sentence of the work pointedly reads ‘This book is an attack on current city planning and rebuilding’ (3, emphasis added).
Although *Death and life* remains a classic of western anti-urbanism, Jacobs’ other works also testify to the importance of the ‘kind of problem cities pose’ (1961, 428, epigraph above). In *The economy of cities* (1969), for example, she argues against the commonly held belief that it is the development of agriculture that made cities possible and suggests that the agglomeration characteristic of cities in fact made the development of agriculture possible. In *Cities and the wealth of nations* (1984) she admonishes the conflation of city and national economies, underscores the dependence of the latter upon the former, and proposes that cities in fact depend on other cities in order to arise and flourish (140). She is also aware of what is at stake when we take on the problem of city economies: ‘the healing of organisms – including the organisms known as economies – is not at all the same as the metamorphosis of organisms, the conversion of them into something different’ (7). Overall, she argues, the ‘kind of problem cities pose’ creates the need to recognize complexity, hails a return to process and emphasizes the formulation of questions over a search for easy answers. The first step is to...
The importance of the temporal process was not lost on Jacobs (Alexiou 2006, 77). Jacobs writes that 'Cities happen to be problems in complexity, like the life sciences'. She continues, stating that:

They present ‘situations in which a half-dozen or even several dozen quantities are all varying simultaneously and in subtly interconnected ways’. Cities, again like the life sciences, do not exhibit one problem in organized complexity, which if understood explains all. They can be analyzed into many such problems or segments which, as in the case of the life sciences, are also related with one another. The variables are many, but they are not helter-skelter; they are 'interrelated into an organic whole'. (Jacobs 1961, 433, original emphasis)

This complexity of urban process shares with the life sciences the primary quality of evolution, movement, change. Lefebvre, in fact, speaks favorably of Jacobs and also acknowledges the complexity of the urban problem (Lefebvre 1970, 19, 45). This complexity arises from the indivisibility of movement and process. There is no simple or static model that will suffice to explain the movement that characterizes cities.

Nevertheless, urban planners, charges Jacobs, have insisted upon dealing with the city as thing, a simple material object. It is this simplistic definition of the city as a static object that has led to what she described as the stagnation of city planning (1961, 439). It is evident that if we are to apprehend the city as the product of the spatialization of time and yet realize that the complexity of urban phenomena overflows these static designs, we must . . .

Critique abstractions, applaud the concrete (Tenet #2)

A city sidewalk by itself is nothing. It is an abstraction. (Jacobs 1961, 29)

Although urban design may tend to envision space as a homogeneous and purely extensive medium upon which it can act, this type of space is a poor representation of the complex character of urban life. Bergson wrote that this idea of space was a ‘view taken by mind’ (1907, 157). It is a particular kind of thought that Bergson termed the ‘intellect’ that routinely reduced movement to static snapshots that approached quality only through quantity. Thus Lefebvre’s capitalistic spatialization of time finds its counterpart in Bergson’s description of ‘intellectual’ thought (Fraser 2008a). Although he sought to point out the errors of traditional philosophical thought from within the discipline itself, in The creative mind (1934) Bergson calls for a return to the reality of city life. From today’s perspective, his words square with Jacobs’ own criticism of the rationally conceived planned city: ‘Though all the photographs of a city taken from all possible points of view indefinitely complete one another, they will never equal in value that dimensional object, the city along whose streets one walks’ (Bergson 1934, 160–61). What Bergson and Jacobs both critique is the reduction of the complexity of city life to static views or abstract plans. The sidewalk, Jacobs writes, ‘is an abstraction’. The implication is that urban life overflows this abstraction. In fact, the vehement anti-urbanist herself seems at times to be on the verge of philosophizing:

We constantly make organized selections of what we consider relevant and consistent from among all the things that cross our senses. We discard, or tuck into some secondary
awareness, the impressions that do not make sense for our purposes of the moment – unless those irrelevant impressions are too strong to ignore. (Jacobs 1961, 378)

Such a description of interested nature of perception places Death and life in the same class as Bergson’s Matter and memory (1896), where in addition to positing a selective theory of memory he argues for an ontology of the ‘image’ as more than what the realist calls a thing and less than what the idealist calls a representation. Perception, tinged by memory, is selective, discarding that which does not interest it.

If homogeneous divisible space is an abstraction (Lefebvre and Bergson), and if perception is by nature interested (Bergson and Jacobs), what is more often than not lost in approaching the city, as all three critics concur, is the concrete and complex fluidity of the movement of urban life. This concrete moving reality is there despite the limiting views of intellect (Bergson) or of the typical view of urban planning (Jacobs). The only way to approach this mobile complexity is not through creation of a new abstraction or static model of experience, but through acknowledging the questionable nature of abstractions themselves, paying attention to their insufficiency and, through what Bergson called intuition, tracing their development and application by means of ‘thinking backwards’ (see Moore 1996). One of the ways in which the intellect converts the variegated concreteness of life into a simplistic representation is through the discourse of art. Thus, as relates to conceptions of the city, it is important to . . .

Renounce the discourse of art and return to the real world (Tenet #3)

A city cannot be a work of art. (Jacobs 1961, 372, original emphasis)

The pseudoscience of city planning and its companion, the art of city design, have not yet broken with the specious comfort of wishes, familiar superstitions, oversimplifications, and symbols, and have not yet embarked upon the adventure of probing the real world. (Jacobs 1961, 13)

As Jacobs writes, ‘To approach a city, or even a city neighborhood, as if it were a larger architectural problem, capable of being given order by converting it into a disciplined work of art, is to make the mistake of attempting to substitute art for life’ (1961, 373). Our cities are not canvases for urban design, but rather living realities. Yet, as Jacobs contends, urban design nevertheless tends to place the concept before the reality, reducing the complexity of the concrete to the brute simplicity of the abstract. This view ignores that, as Harvey has underscored, abstractions are given concrete shape and form in real life (1985, Chapter 6). Thus, approaches to the city that place the simplistic reductionism characteristic of representational thought before the complexity characteristic of lived realities tend to be insufficient.

It is this very approach that Jacobs denounces in the modern planning tradition going back to 1898 and English court reporter Ebenezer Howard’s now classic ideal of the Garden City (1961, 17–25). Howard’s approach wholeheartedly embraced the ‘intellectual’ (in the Bergsonian sense), homogeneous view of space as divisible over the less practical view of movement as irreducible and complex. He started with thought in the abstract to then fine-tune the spatialization of temporal process, the Production of space (Lefebvre 1974), that would be harnessed by capitalism throughout the twentieth century (Lefebvre 1973). Of course, public ownership of
the land was, as Mumford (1963) notes, a part of Howard’s plan that has been ignored by his ‘superficial imitators’ (157). It is nonetheless still true, as Jacobs states concisely, that ‘Howard set spinning powerful and city-destroying ideas: he conceived that the way to deal with the city’s functions was to sort and sift out of the whole certain simple uses, and to arrange each of these in relative self-containment’ (1961, 18). Instead of seeing the city as a movement, as a complex living reality, it was now an agglomeration of discrete, mutually exclusive parts to be assembled piece-meal. ‘[Howard] conceived of good planning as a series of static acts’ (1961, 19). Through these static acts, the temporal process and complexity characteristic of city life was ignored and devastated.

As can be imagined, this spatialized framework encouraged the poor formulation of solutions to urban problems that focused on things instead of processes. Thus Jacobs denounces the simplistic logic characteristic of the parks movement:

Conventionally, neighborhood parks or parklike open spaces are considered boons conferred on the deprived populations of cities. Let us turn this thought around, and consider city parks deprived places that need the boon of life and appreciation conferred on them. (Jacobs 1961, 89, 91, original emphasis; see also Rosenzweig 1983; Fraser 2007b)

For Jacobs, the city is a complex, living organism. In Bergsonian terms we can say that the difference between the city as process and the city as product is a difference in kind (1889, 1896), or a difference between the open and the closed (1932). As Jacobs puts it, ‘The difference is the difference between dealing with living, complex organisms, capable of shaping their own destinies, and dealing with fixed and inert settlements, capable merely of custodial care (if that) of what has been bestowed upon them’ (1961, 132). Approaching the city as a process and not merely as a product will, however, ultimately require not only a process methodology but a process pedagogy as well.

**Matters of pedagogy**

If temporal process is important in approaching the city methodologically, it is imperative in approaching it pedagogically. The greatest obstacle in both cases is what Bergson (1907) called the ‘intellect’ – a way of thinking that has adopted the rather pernicious practice of applying the apparently discrete boundaries of things themselves to the realm of abstract ideas. The pedagogy that results from this flawed type of thinking approaches the city more as a thing than as a complex process, and the result risks being a mechanical search for answers at the expense of the formulation of new and more challenging questions. The problem in approaching things this way, as philosopher-geographer Henri Lefebvre argued, is that before space is conceived it is *lived* (1974, ‘Like all social practice, spatial practice is lived directly before it is conceptualized; but the speculative primacy of the conceived over the lived causes practice to disappear along with life’, 32, also 34). It thus is to the concrete nature of *life*, argue both Lefebvre and Bergson each with his own aim and each in his own way, to which abstract reasoning and concepts must be returned. For his part, Lefebvre undertook a three volume *Critique of everyday life* (1947, 1961, 1981) and denounced the static character of analysis while advocating a thought more attuned to rhythms in *Rhythmanalysis* (1992). Bergson, years before Lefebvre,
stressed the indivisible nature of movement and noted the complex relationship between space and time in the face of the reductive positivistic and scientific models of experience entrenched in mid-to-late nineteenth century thought (1889, 1903). Pedagogically placing the movement of life (Bergson) – life’s rhythms (Lefebvre) – prior to intellectual analysis thus challenges the priority given to static models of the city and, bucking an entrenched philosophical tradition, asserts the city as a process.

This view of the city has important pedagogical consequences. If the city is indeed envisioned as a process, then the teacher must require the student to engage with that complex process itself, and not merely with a static snapshot of it. It is with a similar aim that Lefebvre signaled that the rhythmianalyst ‘calls on all his senses’ and ‘thinks with his body, not in the abstract, but in lived temporality’ (1992, 21). In this vein, Alison Phipps (2007) has highlighted the complexity and even sensuous nature of knowledge. Similarly, Stephen Dobson (2006) has supported the idea that college-age students be encouraged to drift around the city in order to know it – in the tradition of the psycho-geography advocated by Guy Debord and the Situationists (Jacobs notably suggested that planning of cities itself embrace an ‘esthetics of drift’, 1984, 221).

Rather than outline a list of appropriate pedagogical practices, my goal in this section is to explore the philosophical case for process-oriented and experiential approaches to city life. Nevertheless, I want to briefly note a few ways in which this philosophical case resonates with pedagogical changes that are already underway. For example, pedagogically privileging a kind of city drifting, perhaps as a small group activity, may be beneficial to a generation of students who, as Tormey and Henchy (2008) note, simultaneously struggle with both the traditional lecture and an inherited passive-learning style. Framing the problem of cities as a complex and thus open-ended one also allows kind of dialogue that is a necessary part of a ‘community of learners’ – a key refashioning of a more traditional pedagogical approach (Carnell 2007). There is also the possibility to construct a participatory action research approach (Rohleder et al. 2008) on the basis of this philosophical case, now applied to cities as a key site for student activism (Dilworth 2008). Whatever form this process-oriented pedagogy may take, it is always necessary to . . .

**Start from experience (Tenet #4)**

Because we use cities, and therefore have experience with them, most of us already possess a good groundwork for understanding and appreciating their order. (Jacobs 1961, 376)

In approaching the city as process, both methodologically and pedagogically, we must start with the ‘immediate data of consciousness’ as Bergson titled his first work (1889 – in the original French *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*; also Bernard 1865; Bergson 1934). We must redeem physical reality, see the material as already infused with immaterial process (Latham and McCormack 2004). This is to return to our experience, to our lived realities (Lefebvre 1974), to the real movement and process of life. This dynamic methodological premise finds its complement in dynamic models of pedagogy. By dynamic I mean that knowledge must not be conceived in static terms (‘theory of knowledge and theory of life seem to us inseparable’, Bergson 1907, xiii; also Harvey 1989, 7).
Critical pedagogue Paolo Freire provides such a dynamic pedagogy through his denunciation of ‘banking education’ through which students are envisioned as passive receptacles for deposits of knowledge made by their teachers. Education, he says, cannot be seen as ‘a set of things, pieces of knowledge, that can be superimposed on or juxtaposed to the conscious body of the learners’ (1970, 72; see also 1998). Likewise, explicitly engaging this tradition articulated by Freire in *Pedagogy of the oppressed*, bell hooks (1994) (the lower-case moniker under which Gloria Watkins has published numerous books) has argued that education should be the ‘practice of freedom’. Knowledge is thus a bodily experience, a social practice. Its origin is not the abstract realm of disembodied speculative thought, but rather, in the fashion of Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) ‘organic intellectuals’, the concrete, complex, moving, and lived realities, an evolving whole that is structured by urban process. In this context, students must be encouraged to start from their own experiences of cities, to seek out connections between what they have experienced and what they have read, to integrate knowledge with life.

This approach to knowledge as a bodily experience, as bell hooks explores in part, is certainly at odds with many aspects of university education as it is currently approached not merely by institutions and faculty but students as well. Nevertheless, despite the static hierarchies and power structures that pervade the larger social and educational bodies (hooks 1994) and the examination-oriented, solution-driven models of abstract approaches to social questions, teachers and students may collaborate to create learning environments that are more attuned to the difficult, time-consuming process of the proper formulation of social problems (Marx, Bergson, and Jacobs), and not merely their simple solution. This environment differs quite a bit from that encouraged by the traditional disciplinary structure and administrative policies of today’s universities which focus on strategies and technical knowledge (Fitzmaurice 2008). A process-oriented model of education starts with experience and opens outward onto the whole of society. Here, the quick answers demanded by strict timetables, whether they are those of capitalist investment or of the university semester course, yield to the importance of spending more time thinking through the question itself; something which may require significant shifts for all involved – among them, the need to...
the vision of a differentiated and complex but nevertheless intimately connected and constantly changing social whole.

The emerging and ongoing reconciliation between geography and the humanities (urban theory and philosophy in particular) is one of the most important disciplinary reconciliations in this regard. Finally embracing an idea that has long been central to anthropology, theorists have redefined culture as a process having both material and immaterial components. This has enabled other reconciliations, for example that between culture and the state (Steinmetz 1999; Marston 2004) as well as that between culture and the economy (Jessop 1990; Zukin 1995). The challenge for scholarship across the board has been to renounce the philosophical schism denounced by Bergson (1896, 1907) between realism and idealism. The avatars of this primary and insufficient philosophical opposition tend to evoke either a materiality completely determined by immaterial forces, or immaterial forces as mere reflections of material processes. Ultimately, however, I believe that the complex problem posed by cities implicates all of the disciplines that currently call the university home and perhaps many more still. It is also important to...
nature of city problems. These dialogues should not be teleologically driven toward arriving at a solution for the purposes of a final paper. The emphasis should not be on a final product, but on continually engaging with new ideas, new perspectives and new interactions. Students should seek to get feedback on their own understandings of cities from people both in and outside of the classroom, both inside and outside of the university. They should be ready to revise their ideas, to recognize the assumptions and abstractions implicit in their own approaches – just as should teachers and administrators.

Conclusion
Ultimately, the ‘kind of problem cities pose’ is a complex one. I have attempted to make the philosophical case for reconciling our methodology for understanding cities with the pedagogy we use to approach them in a learning setting. As with cities, thought, too, must be recognized as a complex process. It is only thought as a process that can begin to approach the process and the problems of urban life. Jane Jacobs’ classic work in anti-urbanism offers suggestions for city planners directly but also, as I have shown, indirectly for students approaching cities as a process. The problem of cities requires that we seek out new directions in teaching and learning just as in urban design. In both cases, as The death and life of great American cities suggests, the first step is to relinquish the need for a quick answer and, as Marx, Bergson and Jacobs all agree, to place more weight on the proper formulation of questions.

References
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